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This case is about what rights the parties have under federal land patents 
issued to their respective predecessors in interest. Appellant Nadine F. Gillmor's 
("Gillmor") title stems from a grant by the United States of a homestead patent to 
John Clark on December 20, 1930. Clark's application was filed in 1917 with the 
regional land office located in Salt Lake City, Utah after Congress had passed 
The Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 and the Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916 
(the "1916 Act"). John Clark's application was for a homestead patent under the 
1916 Act on land upon which he had previously made entry. 
REPLY TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Blue Ledge indicates that it disagrees with the statement of issues 
presented by Gillmor in her opening brief. See UTAH R. APP. P. 24 (b)(1). 
However, Blue Ledge has not filed an appeal. Thus, its recitation of its "issues 
presented for review" in Gillmor's appeal is not helpful. The opening brief filed by 
appellant, Gillmor, sets forth the issues presented for review and now before this 
Court: 
1) When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must 
consider all undisputed material facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D&K Management, Inc., 2003 UT 5, U 6. Did 
the trial court err in how it applied the respective procedural burdens borne by the 
parties? Brief of Appellant, p. 1 (Issue No. 1). 
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2) A title granted by the United States is entitled to a strong presumption in 
favor of the validity. Did the trial court err in quieting title in appellee, determining 
that no title passed to appellant's predecessor in interest, via patent, in 1930? 
Brief of Appellant, p. 1 (Issue No 2.a). 
3) A suit by the United States or its successors to annul or vacate any 
patent must be brought within six years after the issuance of the patent. 43 
U.S.C. § 1166. Did the trial court err when it ruled that appellant could not assert 
that six-year statute of limitations to bar appellee's quiet title counterclaim? Brief 
of Appellant, p. 2 (Issue No. 2.b). 
4) Did the trial court err when, in spite of the parties' joint inaction, it 
dismissed with prejudice appellant's claims and defenses based on adverse 
possession for failure to prosecute them but did not also dismiss with prejudice 
appellee's counterclaim? Brief of Appellant, p. 2 (Issue No. 3). 
The first three (3) issues are reviewed for correctness. Brief of Appellant, 
p. 1-2. "'[Correctness' means the appellate court decides the matter for itself 
and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law." State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); see also Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 
1254, 1256 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The final issue is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, U 15, 46 P.3d 753, 
756. 
2 
REPLY TO BLUE LEDGE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Blue Ledge asserts that the facts related to Gillmor's adverse possession 
claim are irrelevant to the issues on appeal. Brief of Appellee, p. 11-12. 
However, the district court's dismissal with prejudice of Gillmor's adverse 
possession claim is squarely before this Court, and indeed one of the issues on 
appeal. Thus, facts related to Gillmor's adverse possession claim are clearly 
crucial to this Court's analysis. 
Blue Ledge alleges that both surface and mining estates were granted to 
Clegg. Brief of Appellee, p. 12-13. As set forth more fully below, Gillmor disputes 
that both the surface and mining estates were conveyed from the United States to 
Clegg by patent dated May 22, 1929, R.367-374, 523-24, Transcript of Hearing of 
November 7, 2005, R.627, at 14:18-16:12, 16:22-17:2, 17:19-18:16. Gillmor 
specifically pointed out that "[t]he Defendant fails to argue against the laws 
conveying the Homestead Patent." R.374. This is critical where a United States 
Supreme Court decision from the very era in question has recognized that 
Congress had explicitly intended the land office to partition properties between 
uses when issuing patents so as to maximize the beneficial exploitation of the 
land. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 503, 48 S. Ct. 580, 583, 72 
L. Ed. 961, 966 (1928) ("The acts of 1914 and 1920 are to be read together --
each as the complement of the other. So read they disclose an intention to 
divide oil and gas lands into two estates for the purposes of disposal - one 
3 
including the underlying oil and gas deposits and the other the surface -
and to make the latter servient to the former, which naturally would be suggested 
by their physical relation and relative values. [Emphasis added.]") 
Similarly, Blue Ledge alleges that fee title was passed through a series of 
owners ultimately to Blue Ledge. Brief of Appellee, p. 14. However, only ipse 
dixit has ever been offered by Blue Ledge to support its claim that its patent 
encompassed the entire fee in light of the surface rights plainly conveyed under 
the Clark patent. 
Blue Ledge asserts that the case of United Park City Mines Company v. 
Estate ofClegg, 737 P.2d 173 (Utah 1987) is germane to the instant case on 
appeal. Brief of Appellee, p. 14-15. That case has no bearing on the present 
action. Neither Nadine F. Gillmor, nor her husband, Frank Gillmor, were parties 
to that action, and therefore no claim of ownership of the disputed property was 
adjudicated in United Park City Mines Company v. Estate of Clegg. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
The district court's grant of summary judgment to Blue Ledge was in error. 
The district court failed to acknowledge the strong presumption that the Clark 
Patent, ultimately held by Gillmor, is valid in all respects. When a land patent is 
granted by the United States, the presumption favors validity. Clear and 
convincing evidence is required to overcome that presumption. Once Gillmor 
presented a prima facie case showing title by competent evidence, the burden 
4 
rested upon Blue Ledge to controvert th< CWNIUIU , M I " • •' •-1« i« t v d c i ' t v,i > 
insufficient to overcome that presumption. 
Clegg's Patent did not automatically convey surface rights to Clegg The 
factual record shows that the Clark Patent was i '....'.. ...loiiw iq 
Patent issued one year before. Since the Congress had instructed the land office 
lu ilispose of property, where appropriate, by splitting the surface from the 
mineral rights, the fact that the land office did so with I I I M hit* p id nl H> CPMIHI 
to the United States the mineral rights, suggests that the land office followed that 
mandate /ery case The land office clearly determined to grant Clark all of 
the surface rights in the land except thosr >s 
reasonably incident [or necessary] to the mining.'" Belle Fourche Pipeline Co v 
State Mtiil >\\ i l l V l i iMyo 1988)(discussing the very Act under which the 
Clark patent issued, The Agricultural I nl , •> I il 1()11 m I II c ' t M MMi m j 
Homestead Act of 1916). 
Blue Ledge's argument that 43 U.S C. § 1166 is inapplicable flows from its 
erroneous position that the United States 11 i I 11 I I I | • 11 » I > 
Clark under a homestead patent. However, Clegg many years ago stood in the 
shoeb ...' I!,. .dderal government. Blue Ledge today stands in the shoes of the 
federal government and is subject to the statutoi, linni.iii,m , nl .n imn • \h leu , 
As a result, the trial court should have found the Blue Ledge suit barred by 43 
I I M {j11M>. 
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Finally, fundamental fairness demands that the dismissal of Gillmor's 
adverse possession claim be set aside. Both parties equally delayed prosecution 
of their respective claims. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in 
dismissing Gillmor's claim but awarded Blue Ledge a final judgment on its 
counterclaim. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO BLUE LEDGE. 
Blue Ledge argues that it satisfied its burden of proof to quiet title to the 
disputed property. Brief of Appellee, p. 17. Blue Ledge states that a party must 
prevail on its own strength of claim to title, and not the other parties' weakness. 
Citing Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d 734 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Blue 
Ledge states that each party must assume the burden on establishing its title by 
competent evidence. Citing Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 76 
P.3d 711 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). Finally, Blue Ledge states that if a party can 
make a prima facie case showing title, the burden is on the opposing party to 
controvert the evidence. Citing Babcock v. Dangerfield, 94 P.2d 862 (Utah 1939). 
Blue Ledge's position actually cuts in favor of Gillmor and strongly supports 
Gillmor's position that the trial court failed to apply the strong presumption that 
the Clark Patent held by Gillmor is valid in all respects. When a land patent is 
granted by the United States, the presumption is in favor of validity. United 
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States v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co. ef a/, I < I U ! > VS 17{ I , M I I i) I ' > 1028 
(1887). To overcome that strong presumption, clear and convincing evidence is 
ifM|uiirr1 M inrnphasis added). 
[t]o avoid such 'solemn evidences of title emanating from the government 
of the United States under its official seal' requires the observance of the 
early established rule that it 'cannot be done upon a bare preponderance of 
evidence which leaves the issue in doubt' even more than in suits between 
private parties for such cancellations. Only 'that class of evidence which 
commands respect, and that amount of it which produces conviction shall 
make such an attempt successful.' 
United States v. Otley, 127 F.2d. 988, 995 (9th Cir. 1942). Blue Ledge's position 
lest*- i HI il- perceived weakness in Gillmor's title. However, once Gillmor has 
made her prima facie case showing title ". -•• . ompetenl v-\ \<\\ m c m i litle 
granted by the United States under a homestead patent), the burden rests upon 
Hut I i ilijt1 lu IIIK ut 11 the evidence The land office clearly determined to 
grant Clark all of the surface rights in the larnI c) i pfil thosi I .M[ I>I» | • \n\ l 
for all purposes reasonably incident [or necessary] to the mining.'" Belle Fourche 
I'IIMIIIH I ti i . »M/f i bi l l , i l ' i . l i i4'iiWyu 1988)(discussing the very Act 
under which the Clark patent issued, The Acj u MI I ul I H4 rind Hit 
Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916). Blue Ridge's evidence simply does not 
• ;:.. ,..iisumption »l validity that must be afforded to Gillmor's title that 
flows from Clark's homestead patent. 
Furthermore, Blue Ledge was required to "show both that there is no 
maten.il r.sut i i l i I i i i ,,iat [it as] the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
7 
matter of law." On/is v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, U 10,117 P.3d 600, 602. Where 
the moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant must 
establish each element of his claim in order to show that he is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. In order to meet his initial burden on 
summary judgment, therefore, [Appellees] must [have] presented] 
evidence sufficient to establish that [quieting title in its favor] is appropriate 
under the facts of the case, and that no material issues of fact remain. The 
burden on summary judgment then shifts to the nonmoving party 
[Appellants] to identify contested material facts, or legal flaws in the [claim 
that title should be quieted in Appellee]. 
Id. (citing UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c)(emphasis in original). Herein, there remain 
significant, material facts in dispute, facts as to which Blue Ledge offered only 
speculation. Why was Johanna A. Clark issued a homestead patent only one (1) 
year after Clegg was issued a mining patent? Blue Ledge only has a "hunch" as 
to why that happened and speculates that the land office simply "goofed." R. 627 
at 2-4. Why did the land office cancel Clark's patent only to the extent of "conflict" 
with Clegg's patent upon Clegg's protest of the Clark application and why did 
Clegg never challenge the issuance of Clark's homestead patent covering the 
surface of the same land? Blue Ledge offers no explanation. Blue Ledge's 
speculation and silence does not satisfy the strict requirements of Rule 56©). 
Federal patents do not grant rights as of the date of issuance of the patent, but 
rather based on the more factually complex determination of the date that an 
applicant's "claim of right" came into being. See United States v. Etcheverry, 230 
F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1956)(citing cases). Thus, the Clegg patent, although 
8 
issued first in time, might be second in claim nf in|hl Hi il i i in IIIM » > Uv,\u\ Iy 
within the jurisdiction of the land office to adjudicate and it apparently did so, 
meaning that the Clegg patent received the residual mineral rights. Blue Ledge 
offered no evidence to the contrary. 
II CLEGG'S 1930 PATENT DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVEY 
SURFACE RIGHTS TO CLEGG. 
I'In I ci l j i iliny stveidl cases, claims that a mining patent automatically 
includes the surface estate, as well as the mineral estate unless the patent 
contains a reservation. The cases relied upon by Blue Ledge, set forth below, do 
niN i. in i i , .in ;,,.!. ; ; r iu™ as asserted by Blue Ledge. None of the 
cases dealt with patents issued less than a year from one another, when111 me 
patent issued under The Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 and the Stock Raising 
I liniii'sledd Ai I ill I Mi. ill ic l i Hi Ail ') requiring a reservation to the United 
States of the mineral rights. 
St Louis Mining & Milling Company of Montana v. Montana Mining Co., 
I 11 11J» A I! 111 )U 11 w.is <i case involving tunneling mines of two different mining 
companies. One of the companies discovered an addition n 
the surface of its property downward into the Nine Hour clair,.. ,d. at 236. Given 
HIP far I: nl IIIU i.j A., II K HI mil Imiiiil lliatthe mining company could have 
pursued a subsurface vein that crossed surface property line;, MI IIHKI as IIu 
apex of the vein originated on the surface of the claim. However, the Court did 
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not allow an access tunnel to do the same. The case simply predates the 
passage of the 1916 Act, and did not involve a grazing patent issued under that 
Act with its required reservation of mineral rights. 
The case Deffebach v. Haeke, 115 U.S. 392 (1885), likewise predates the 
1916 Act and also dealt with a placer mining claim. The Supreme Court therein 
indicated "[t]he patent of a placer mining claim carries with it the title to the 
surface included within the lines of the mining location, as well as to the land 
beneath the surface . . . . " Id. at 406. Because rivers and streams run on the 
surface, clearly a placer claim would include surface rights. In contrast, herein 
the Clegg patent was not a placer mining claim, and the mandate of Congress to 
split surface and mineral rights, followed by a land office adjudication, leaves the 
surface rights to Blue Ledge under the mining patent as only those "'required for 
all purposes reasonably incident [or necessary] to the mining.'" Belle Fourche 
Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537, 545 (Wyo. 1988). 
The facts of both Superior Coal Co. v. Musselshell County, 41 P.2d 14 
(Mont. 1935) and Hinz v. Musselshell County, 267 P. 1113 (Mont 1928) were 
related to taxation issues. In addition, neither explicates any facts about the 
issuance of the patents involved that would suggest that they post-dated passage 
of the 1916 Act. Therein, the owners of the properties at issue in the two cases 
were trying to avoid taxation of mineral rights on property where the use of the 
property had only been surface use. The discussion of the surface rights was 
10 
relevant only to those taxation issues and not as j n y um-i i jdl ink ul ni|liL 
accorded by a mineral patent. 
Heiciii Iwl : ..: ...;....:..::.. Ueggs protest and the Land office 
canceled her homestead entry to the extent it "rnnflirtnl "illi Hie i l< 1111' il nl 
Nevertheless, the Land office issued the Clark Patent As a result, this Court 
inn ,11 inn hull Hi.il Hit I ,iinl ulTii < » dUiun ww.i. h«i »< il on its finding that no 
"conflict" existed between the two patents, even llminih llicw cm IHIIIMSMMI IIic 
same land. This conclusion would be mandatory if the land office concluded that 
-• of the Clark 
. aie:u, because the mandatory c^i, t, 
required by the 1916 Act, ipso facto elm in i tit"- my conflict I lie Uaik hulunt 
"7i' i1-'''i ii 11 III 11 ii 11 ii HI i1 "ill i II iM Lit i III I' ill i l l r ' upd one year before 
The Clark Patent contains thL lulluminij Lni ju jqt 
"Excepting and reserving, howevei, to the United otates all the coal and 
other minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with the right 
to prospect for, mine, and remove the same pursuant to the provisions and 
limitations of the Art of December 29, 1916 (39 Stat., 862)." 
Ex A ol "It I to R 358-383 The land office clearly determined to qrant 's«*,|< j | | 
ul II u jurface rights in the lam 11 xcept those reasonably necessary to j 
under the mineral right > ri< IHMAMMIM IK IIIIIIII <l III In-, MM nl ilic surtace to those 
activities reasonably related to the reserved mineral rights the United St \\\ « 
11 
granted him. Blue Ledge offered no evidence to refute this reasonable 
explanation. 
Blue Ledge also asserts that the United States did not have title to the 
patented claims at the time of the Gillmor Patent. Brief of Appellee, p. 21. In 
support, Blue Ledge offers no actual facts governing the claims of right, but rather 
cites St. Louis Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636 (1881). Under St. Louis 
Smelting Co. and the other cases cited in support of Blue Ledge's position, 
however, it is only where proof is shown that the land office acted outside of its 
jurisdiction may a patent be assailed in a court of law: 
A patent, in a court of law, is conclusive as to all matter property 
determined by the Land Department, when its action is within the 
scope of its authority, that is, when it has jurisdiction under the law to 
convey the land. In that court the patent is unassailable for mere 
errors of judgment. 
St. Louis Smelting Co., 104 U.S. at 646. The rule is so strong that even "[i]f in 
issuing a patent its officers took mistaken views of the law, or drew erroneous 
conclusions from the evidence, or acted from imperfect views of their duty, or 
even from corrupt motives, a court of law can afford no remedy to a party alleging 
that he is thereby aggrieved." Id. at 647. Blue Ledge failed to produce any 
evidence that the land office had no authority to grant Clark a homestead patent 
for the disputed property. As set forth above, Blue Ledge cannot prove with clear 
and convincing evidence that it was given the surface rights to the property at 
issue. Because Blue Ledge has failed to show that the land office lacked 
12 
authority tn grinM hrk ' i hnmestmd p'llnnl < h r l ' ' palfnl hemmc 
unassailable. 
Ill U U.S.C. § 1166 PROHIBITS BLUE LEDGE FROM CHALLENGING 
CLARK'S PATENT. 
Blue Ledge's argument that 43 II ° r § 11 cr |i|iln,ill II In i I 
orrnneous position, and the conch v inn of the trial court, that thu United States 
I H I I no IIIIH in HIP piopeily \ un„; „pil In \ hik under a homestead patent "ru~ 
trial court simply erred in ruling that the .tntutr i . mil applu ,\\\U In u I 
437 The statute provides in pertinent part: "Suits by the UIIIILU UUlus to vacate 
nnrl nnnnl nny pntnnt r r rmt t r r [nttnr lwhrrh ' HM1] issued shall only be 
brought within sixyeais dllei IIif d -IIH nl Hie IS^IHIH e nl HI< II p ilenl1- -I i 
U S C §1166 Blue Ledge offi i . im I.n I . Im its proposition that it dues not 
hi I II ' I J IIIU United States I 'nel of Appellee, p 24 Clegg 
was plainly a successor in owner*u 
Blue Ledge's quiet title clain * . jntlrely on itself being 
-in 11 . .in in nili it .I lii IIii Uegg patenl I In i< lore, Blue Ledge is clearly a 
successor to the United States if the Cleqq P Liti.nl _i , _
 ( u l „ijiii_lliin | Mi 
Clegg many years ago stood in the shoes of the federal government. Blue Ledge 
linl,v./ .Iiiiiil in llir linr nl lliu ledeul government and is subject to the 
statutory limitations of actions defense The trial 11mi I .IKIIIIII li.iyt luiiiul llu 
n 
Blue Ledge suit was barred by 43 U.S.C. § 1166 because it was filed nearly 
seventy years too late. 
Even if the Clark patent were void, which it is not, 43 U.S.C. § 1166 makes 
it unassailable. The United States Supreme Court has stated: 
It is said that the instrument was void and hence was no patent. But 
the statute presupposes an instrument that might be declared void. 
When it refers to "any patent heretofore issued," it describes the 
purport and source of the document, not its legal effect. If the act 
were confined to valid patents it would be almost or quite without 
use. In form the statute only bars suits to annul the patent. But 
statutes of limitation, with regard to land, at least, which cannot 
escape from the jurisdiction, generally are held to affect the right, 
even if in terms only directed against the remedy. This statute must 
be taken to mean that the patent is to be held good and is to have 
the same effect against the United States that it would have had if it 
had been valid in the first place. 
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447, 450 (1908) 
(emphasis added) (ruling that even if patent were void, claim was barred by 
statute of limitations). See also Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70, 77 (1908) 
(stating that "[i]n United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 
447, it was decided that this act applied to patents even if void because of a 
previous reservation of the land, and it was said that the statute not merely took 
away the remedy but validated the patent"). 
IV. FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS DEMANDS THAT THE DISMISSAL OF 
GILLMOR'S ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIM BE SET ASIDE. 
This issue is one of fairness. Blue Ledge states that Gillmor failed to 
prosecute her adverse possession claim for over thirteen years. Brief of 
14 
Appellee, p. 30-31. The procedural hist ,111 i is< I II I i IIn | I, 
pursued their various claims until nij Gillmor's adverse possession claim did 
i i the district court until the parties briefed a motion for summary 
judgment filed on February 25, 2005 P PR 354) After HIP rrntler w \< hiinleH 
.Hid argued, the district court issued a Ruling and Order dated November 8, 2005, 
yyliuuu IIIL UJUII luiiiul II u l there were indeed genuine issues of material facts 
regarding Gillmor's adverse possession claim P ' I ' ^ l l ' i i MI| :::: : : : ! ! : : , : : : 
pushed the matter forward until Gillmor made overtures toward L-ulllument. Ex. A 
I P '>% J0M lilue Ledge.. response t( II I III ment overture was to filn i 
motion to dismiss Gillmor's adverse possession LLIIIII lui I.JIIUH , lu pi ' 
Blue Ledge attempts to defend its lack of action by simply dlldikiny 
i illmnr " delay I he Utah Supreme Court has expressed disfavor when a party 
blames delays on the other f nil, I I i 11 II \\ ulu in III il i /. 
Department of Social Servs i Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1980) ("fWle 
! ..upressed with either fairness or propriety in one party sitting silently by 
tor a long period of time, thru ntlr ni| lin | I I il in II Hi i | n l " l i Hi ilchy ) 
Crystal Lime & Cement Co. i Hobbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 393, 335 P.2d 624 (1959) 
i . lil ii In .il MI Uluc Ledge's attempt to shift blame exclusively to Gillmor. 
Therein, both parties sought to quiet title y< 
eight years, when the counterclaimant in that action filed a motion to dismiss. 
1«i 
Respondents' contentions might be very persuasive if they had not filed 
counterclaims in the action asking that title be quieted in them and also 
asking that in the event title was not quieted in them that appellant herein 
be required to reimburse them the amounts they expended for taxes. In 
asking for such affirmative relief they were in effect cross-complainants in 
the action . . . . Since any party to this action could have obtained the 
relief to which it was entitled at any time it had wanted but both 
parties chose to dally for a number of years, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the court to grant respondents' motion to dismiss with 
prejudice. 
335 P.2d at 626 (emphasis added). Justice, therefore, requires that this Court set 
aside the dismissal of Gillmor's adverse possession claim and remand it for trial. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Gillmor request that the judgment of the trial court be reversed in its 
entirety, and the matter be remanded for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of February, 2009. , 
PETERS I SCOFIELD / 
, ~~~~^A Professional fprpbration / 
•DAVID W. SCOFIELD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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